[sidr] WGLC - draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered - ends 10/25/2016

Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net> Tue, 11 October 2016 14:08 UTC

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Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2016 10:08:42 -0400
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From: Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>
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Subject: [sidr] WGLC - draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered - ends 10/25/2016
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Howdy WG folks!
The authors of:
  draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered

believe they have addressed all inflight concerns/comments, the
request is to WGLC this, consider it's place in the world and if
appropriate pass this document along to the IESG for publication.

The abstract for this draft is:
  "This document proposes an update to the certificate validation
   procedure specified in RFC 6487 that reduces aspects of operational
   fragility in the management of certificates in the RPKI, while
   retaining essential security features."

Let's have a read through, consider and reply with your thoughts please,
this WGLC is set to expire: 10/25/2016 - October 25, 2016.

thanks for reading/replying/thinking!
-chris
co-chair-persona