Re: [sidr] AD Review of sidr-origin-validation-signaling-09

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Sun, 13 November 2016 07:25 UTC

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Date: Sun, 13 Nov 2016 16:25:36 +0900
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Alvaro Retana <aretana@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] AD Review of sidr-origin-validation-signaling-09
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> C1. The reference to rfc7607 should be Informative.
> 
> C2. [Major] Security Considerations.  I think that there is one
> consideration that should be mentioned in this section: Given that the
> largest value is preferred (2 = invalid), there is an attack vector
> where a router in the path (yes, even an internal router) can inject a
> community indicating that the route is invalid; the communities are
> not protected.  This action could result in inconsistent routing or in
> even a DoS.  I know the document is not explicit about what to do with
> the validation state (which is ok), but the clear intention (from
> rfc6811 and rfc7115) is that it will be used to make routing
> decisions.  Please add some text about this potential issue.

would you prefer a revision soon, or wait for other iesg comments?

randhy