Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles

Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com> Fri, 04 May 2012 15:36 UTC

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Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 11:36:20 -0400
From: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles
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On 5/3/12 10:14 AM, Chris Morrow wrote:
>
>
> On 05/03/2012 03:57 AM, t.petch wrote:
>> A question arising from my ignorance.
>>
>> How do values in the security arc get assigned?  Not IANA since there are no
>> IANA considerations, but how then?
>
> good question... the below are asn.1 things, quickly searching around
> isn't helping me out much either :(
>
> Russ, any idea how this happens in practice? 'lick finger, test wind,
> guess number' seems like the wrong method...

Russ Housley controls the pkix arc (has for years).  If we need a value 
from that arc (e.g., for the EKU extension and module OID), then 
we'll/I'll send a request to Russ for an OID.  He then returns an OID 
after some review.  I know he often compiles the modules too.

If you're curious about the OIDs under the 1.3.6.1.5.5.7 arc, the values 
can be found at: http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/pkix-oid.asn.

The longer term plan is to transition the arc to IANA when PKIX closes.

spt

>>
>> On the IANA profiles web page I can see
>> (1.3.6.1.5.5.4)
>> and
>> (1.3.6.1.5.5.8)
>> but no 1.3.6.1.5.5.7, just a reference to Russ.
>>
>>
>> Tom Petch
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Christopher Morrow"<morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
>> To:<sidr@ietf.org>;<sidr-chairs@ietf.org>
>> Sent: Friday, April 13, 2012 10:16 PM
>>
>> Helo WG peoples,
>> The following update posted today. Sean and Tom have come to agreement
>> on their differences, I believe this closes the last open items on
>> this document.
>>
>> Let's start a WGLC for this, ending: 4/27/2012 or 27/4/2012
>>
>> Thanks!
>> -Chris
>> <co-chair>
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 13, 2012 at 3:03 PM,<internet-drafts@ietf.org>  wrote:
>>>
>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>> directories. This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing
>> Working Group of the IETF.
>>>
>>> Title : A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation
>> Lists, and Certification Requests
>>> Author(s) : Mark Reynolds
>>> Sean Turner
>>> Steve Kent
>>> Filename : draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03.txt
>>> Pages : 11
>>> Date : 2012-04-13
>>>
>>> This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
>>> the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths
>>> in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that
>>> protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper
>>> operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under
>>> development as a component to address the requirement to provide
>>> security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a
>>> protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong
>>> cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
>>> by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure
>>> (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS
>>> Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous
>>> System (AS). The certificate asserts that the router(s) holding the
>>> private key are authorized to send out secure route advertisements on
>>> behalf of the specified AS. This document also profiles the
>>> Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format of
>>> certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate path
>>> validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI; therefore,
>>> this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC
>>> 6487).
>>>
>>>
>>> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03.txt
>>>
>>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>>
>>> This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
>>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03.txt
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> sidr mailing list
>>> sidr@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
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