Re: [sidr] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07: (with COMMENT)

Di Ma <madi@zdns.cn> Fri, 06 April 2018 13:15 UTC

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From: Di Ma <madi@zdns.cn>
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Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 21:15:28 +0800
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, morrowc@ops-netman.net, draft-ietf-sidr-slurm@ietf.org, sidr@ietf.org, sidr-chairs@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [sidr] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07: (with COMMENT)
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Benjamin,

Thanks very much for your comments.

Please see my responses in lines.


> 在 2018年3月31日,01:54,Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> 写道:
> 
> Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07: No Objection
> 
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
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> 
> 
> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> 
> 
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-slurm/
> 
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> The directorate reviews have some good comments, especially about expanding
> acronyms/defining terms.
> 
> I think Section 3.3 would benefit from greater clarity about individual
> components of the JSON array that is the value of the "slurmTarget" element,
> versus that element itself.  (Also, slurmTarget appears to be mandatory, so
> talking about cases where it is present seems strange, and presumably a
> nonempty value being present is the desired criterion.)
> 
> I'm also not entirely sure I understand the intended semantics --
> when first introduced in Section 3.2, we say that "all targets MUST
> be acceptable to the RP".  (Presumably that includes both ASN and
> FQDN entries.) Does this mean that if the same SLURM file is
> provided to multiple RPs, those RPs both need to be "responsible
> for" all the ASNs and FQDNS contained therein?  Would this present a
> limit on the ability to reuse SLURM files for multiple recipients
> within a single administrative domain (that may span multiple ASNs
> and FQDNs)?
> 
> Some editorial suggestions follow.
> 
> Abstract:
> 
> OLD:
> 
>   [...] ISPs can also be able to use the RPKI to validate the
>   path of a BGP route.
> 
> NEW:
> 
>   [...] ISPs can also use the RPKI to validate the
>   path of a BGP route.
> 

ACK.

> Section 3.2
> 
> OLD:
>   o  A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1
> 
> NEW:
>   o  A SLURM Version indication.  This document specifies version 1.
> 

ACK.

> Also, in
> 
>      *  Zero or more target elements.  In this version of SLURM, there
>         are two types of values for the target: ASN or Fully Qualified
>         Domain Name(FQDN).  If more than one target line is present,
>         all targets MUST be acceptable to the RP.
> 
> What’s the difference between a target element and a target line?
> 

We authors have decided to drop the slurmTarget element completely. 

Initially the implementation team was thinking that it would be useful to have the ability to offer the same set of SLURM files to all RPs deployed in a network, where local config of the RP would then evaluate the applicability of each file. However, now that both implementations progressed we reconsider and we feel that it would be better to deal with this on the provisioning side. I.e. only offer the SLURM file(s) relevant to each RP.


> Section 3.5 (both subsections):
> 
> "is locally configured with" does not mention SLURM at all as being
> involved in that configuration; perhaps it should.
> 

We authors are going to make changes as follows: 

3.5.1:

OLD:
Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of ROA
Prefix Assertions.

NEW:
SLURM file(s) can be used to configure an RP with a (possibly empty) array of ROA
Prefix Assertions.

And similarly in 3.5.2

OLD:
Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of BGPsec
Assertions.

NEW:
SLURM file(s) can be used to configure an RP with a (possibly empty) array of
BGPsec Assertions.


> Section 4.2
> 
>   [...] To do so, the RP MUST
>   check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the INR
>   assertions and report errors to the sources that created these SLURM
>   files in question.
> 
> The "report errors to the sources" part seems ineligible for
> MUST-level requirement.
> 
> Also, in case of conflict, does the "MUST NOT use them" apply to all
> SLURM files, only the ones with directly conflicting inputs, or only
> enough files to remove the conflict?

There is a MAY in the first sentence after all.

We will add in this section that ‘The RP gets multiple SLURM files as a set, and the whole set MUST be rejected in case of any overlaps between SLURM files.'

> 
> Section 6
> 
> I'm always a little sad to see security-relevant functionality (such
> as the transport with authenticity and integrity protection of SLRUM
> files over the network) left as out of scope with no examples of
> reasonable usage given.
> 

We authors intend to work on a proposed standard mechanism for updating SLURM files through a secure API in the near future.

 The very proposal is intended to be in a separate draft for SIDROPS. 


> I also wonder if we would benefit from a little discussion of the
> potential routing issues that could arise from using a "broken" (or
> deliberately adversarial) SLURM file, though I expect that the
> target audience is probably pretty familiar with these already.
> 

Well, it has been stated in this document:

 'Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP
  can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP.  It could
  declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice
  versa.  As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security
  implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is
  provided by a third party.'

It is not clear to us what more we should cover here.


Di