Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-13's security guarantees

[Randy Bush <[e-mail]>]

>> an intermediate AS, which does not validate but signs, could apply 
> I’d say that the intermediate AS who didn’t verify the signatures it
> received could be acting on bad info at any time, without any
> conspiring ASs around.  The intermediate AS has no more assurance than
> a non-bgpsec speaker that the route it receives is valid.

it is not worse than unsecured is a form of reasoning i do not buy.

>> prefix-based local policy based on the wrong prefix.  same for any
>> bgp4 peers it may have.
> 
> I see nothing in David’s message about a prefix, so I’m not sure what
> you are talking about.

sorry, i forgot that bgp announces beers.

the colluding systems could have signed a hash of lager when the label
on the announcement was pils.  the intermediate system which does not
validate could base it's mains order on pils and tell it's
non-validating peers to have a pils with them.

> But the intermediate AS and any bgp4 (i.e. non-bgpsec speakers?) peers
> have chosen to be insecure - I see no reason to be concerned.

same fallacious argument.  we are supposed to be making things better,
not leaving them the same.

randy