Re: [sidr] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8360 (5638)

Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net> Wed, 13 February 2019 16:03 UTC

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Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 16:03:17 +0000
Message-ID: <87ftsrvfp6.wl%morrowc@ops-netman.net>
From: Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: gih@apnic.net, ggm@apnic.net, carlos@lacnic.net, tim@ripe.net, andy@arin.net, daniel@afrinic.net, db3546@att.com, aretana.ietf@gmail.com, martin.vigoureux@nokia.com, morrowc@ops-netman.net, sandy@tislabs.com, ydahhrk@gmail.com, sidr@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [sidr] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8360 (5638)
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seems legit to me.


At Wed, 13 Feb 2019 07:33:35 -0800 (PST),
RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>; wrote:
> 
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8360,
> "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Validation Reconsidered".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5638
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Technical
> Reported by: Alberto Leiva Popper <ydahhrk@gmail.com>;
> 
> Section: 4.2.4.4
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
>    7.  Compute the VRS-IP and VRS-AS set values as indicated below:
> 
>        *  If the IP Address Delegation extension is present in
>           certificate x and x=1, set the VRS-IP to the resources found
>           in this extension.
> 
>        *  If the IP Address Delegation extension (...)
> 
>        *  If the IP Address Delegation extension (...)
> 
>        *  If the IP Address Delegation extension is present in
>           certificate x and x=1, set the VRS-IP to the resources found
>           in this extension.
> 
>        *  If the AS Identifier Delegation extension (...)
> 
>        *  If the AS Identifier Delegation extension (...)
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
>    7.  Compute the VRS-IP and VRS-AS set values as indicated below:
> 
>        *  If the IP Address Delegation extension is present in
>           certificate x and x=1, set the VRS-IP to the resources found
>           in this extension.
> 
>        *  If the IP Address Delegation extension (...)
> 
>        *  If the IP Address Delegation extension (...)
> 
>        *  If the AS Identifier Delegation extension is present in
>           certificate x and x=1, set the VRS-AS to the resources found
>           in this extension.
> 
>        *  If the AS Identifier Delegation extension (...)
> 
>        *  If the AS Identifier Delegation extension (...)
> 
> Notes
> -----
> There seems to be a copy-paste error.
> 
> There are two bullet points explaining the initialization of VRS-IP, and none explaining the initialization of VRS-AS.
> 
> All the evidence suggests that the two extensions (IP Address Delegation and AS Identifier Delegation) are meant to be handled similarly, so I believe that the last three bullet points are supposed to perfectly mirror the first three.
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8360 (draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-10)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Validation Reconsidered
> Publication Date    : April 2018
> Author(s)           : G. Huston, G. Michaelson, C. Martinez, T. Bruijnzeels, A. Newton, D. Shaw
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Secure Inter-Domain Routing
> Area                : Routing
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG