[sidr] Adam Roach's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-08: (with COMMENT)

Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Mon, 28 August 2017 23:31 UTC

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From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 16:31:26 -0700
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Subject: [sidr] Adam Roach's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-08: (with COMMENT)
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Adam Roach has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-08: No Objection

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This seems like a good change. Not knowing much about the deployment
practicalities of BGP, I presume that the set of tools used for validation is
sufficiently well-known that CAs will positively know when it is safe to start
using the new OIDs?

I found the lack of an introduction section to be odd. Please double-check this
document against the I-D Nits document; and, in particular, section 2.2:

I believe "Russ Housley" is misspelled section 8.

Please expand the following acronyms upon first use and in the title;
see https://www.rfc-editor.org/materials/abbrev.expansion.txt for guidance.

 - RPKI - Resource Public Key Infrastructure
 - AS - Autonomous System
 - ROA - Route Origin Authorization
 - CA - Certificate Authority
 - CRL - Certificate Revocation List