[sidr] Another potential DOS attack on RP software?

Demian Rosenkranz <drosen2s@smail.inf.h-brs.de> Thu, 23 January 2014 12:46 UTC

Return-Path: <drosen2s@smail.inf.h-brs.de>
X-Original-To: sidr@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: sidr@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 33EDE1A03E6 for <sidr@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 23 Jan 2014 04:46:25 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.85
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.85 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_05=-0.5, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id k4t_eJn0MqMy for <sidr@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 23 Jan 2014 04:46:23 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ux-2s11.inf.fh-bonn-rhein-sieg.de (ux-2s11.inf.fh-bonn-rhein-sieg.de [194.95.66.8]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E74D21A037B for <sidr@ietf.org>; Thu, 23 Jan 2014 04:46:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [192.168.14.38] ([62.153.176.78]) (authenticated bits=0) by ux-2s11.inf.fh-bonn-rhein-sieg.de (8.14.4/8.14.4/Debian-4ska0) with ESMTP id s0NCkJlU023885 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT) for <sidr@ietf.org>; Thu, 23 Jan 2014 13:46:20 +0100
Message-ID: <52E10F1A.8030800@smail.inf.h-brs.de>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 13:46:18 +0100
From: Demian Rosenkranz <drosen2s@smail.inf.h-brs.de>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.2.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: sidr@ietf.org
References: <CF03F5F3.5FD30%keyupate@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <CF03F5F3.5FD30%keyupate@cisco.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"; format="flowed"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Auth: by SMTP AUTH @ ux-2s11
X-MIMEDefang-Info-ge: Gescannt in Inf@FH-BRS, Regeln s. MiniFAQ E-Mail/Mailscanner
X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.73
Subject: [sidr] Another potential DOS attack on RP software?
X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing <sidr.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/sidr>, <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr/>
List-Post: <mailto:sidr@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr>, <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 12:46:25 -0000

Hi,

I'm thinking about another potential DoS attack. An entity which owns a 
CA certificate has the possibility to generate a huge hierarchy of 
further CA certificates without any limitation (as far as I know).

In contrast to the generation of a huge amount of ROAs, this attack 
isn't limited regarding the number of objects/certificates.

I.e. a compromised/bad entity owns a /16 prefix and generates 10000 CA 
certificates and hand down this prefix until the lowest CA certificate 
and generates 2^8 ROAs, a relying party software would be forced to 
check this hierarchy 2^8 times.
Of course, this is kind of a blunt attack but without making any 
provisions, this "local cache flooding" could lead to a disturbance of 
all (worst case) local caches for a certain time. Some smaller RP could 
be slower in remedying this.

Are there any restriction to this attack I've missed? Any feedback is 
very welcome!

Kind regards

Demian