Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Sat, 05 November 2011 01:34 UTC

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Date: Sat, 05 Nov 2011 02:34:48 +0100
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Eric Osterweil <eosterweil@verisign.com>
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References: <E96517DD-BAC7-4DD8-B345-562F71788C6A@tcb.net> <p06240807cad42f85eb7d@193.0.26.186> <32744.216.168.239.87.1320175657.squirrel@webmail.tcb.net> <p06240801cad6ab773279@193.0.26.186> <D9A38669-883D-4090-9F95-BC5C63220950@tcb.net> <p06240801cad800485596@193.0.26.186> <EEBF68E0-FAD9-4AF3-B81B-78760D200D9B@tcb.net> <p06240808cad85ff73d61@193.0.26.186> <080F8FFF-D2C7-4414-B53A-233F88D2009F@vpnc.org> <CAFU7BATC-6DUDNuadakwSa5wj0ryy0=49=XveBXD5Wv=5JL-ag@mail.gmail.com> <m2aa8c489s.wl%randy@psg.com> <53FA9B4A-552C-4998-8F69-592A0F5AA13B@verisign.com> <CAL9jLaZj1wcmDnbm1f9=csUv2Uuq_w3rS6UEYmUHAQDPWT9zFg@mail.gmail.com> <m262iz2xl8.wl%randy@psg.com> <A2661B25-CC2E-44E4-93CE-5AFE4F67E4DA@verisign.com>
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Cc: sidr wg list <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID
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> I think the distinction between a leak and something more intentional
> s a matter of policy.  Knowing the policy associated with the
> adjacencies that an AS is leaking over would allow leaked
> announcements to be identified

o We can not know intent, should Mary have announced the prefix to Bob

o But Joe can formally validate that Mary did announce the prefix to Bob

o Policy on the global Internet changes every 36ms, new customers, new
  peers, circuit moves, ...

o We already have a protocol to distribute policy or its effects, it is
  called BGP 

o BGPsec validates that the protocol has not been violated, and is not
  about intent or business policy

randy