Re: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?

[Joe Touch <[e-mail]>]

On Apr 21, 2011, at 10:10 PM, Christopher Morrow <[e-mail]> wrote:

> On Fri, Apr 22, 2011 at 12:14 AM, Joe Touch <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Apr 21, 2011, at 7:45 PM, Christopher Morrow <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>>> So.. round and round the rosemary bush we go, still we have no actual
>>> things that run actual tcp-ao, so given that can we either:
>>> 
>>> 1) use md5 (as a MUST, with ssh as a MAY) and rev the doc at a later
>>> point to say that AO is a MUST and remove md5
>>> 2) move this doc along the path
>>> 3) get implementations of the protocol today to start using md5
>> 
>> You could instead do what the TCP-AO rfc recommends for apps like BGP:
>> 
>> - MUST support TCP-AO
>> - MAY also support TCP MD5 for backward compatibility
>> 
>> This avoids reinventing an answer for BGP caches and just applies the *current* advice for BGP in general.
>> 
> 
> bgp cache is not bgp... it's really just a random tcp session from a
> router to a thing some where else.
> 
> (does that change your proposed above?)

Nope. (and I was aware it isn't a BGP protocol connection)

Joe


> 
> -Chris
> 
>> Joe
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> -chris
>>> (co-chair-toe-socks-on)
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Apr 20, 2011 at 8:25 PM, Joe Touch <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 4/20/2011 5:19 PM, Brian Weis wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Apr 20, 2011, at 1:40 PM, Joe Touch wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 4/11/2011 12:49 PM, Stephen Kent wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> At 9:30 PM -0700 4/6/11, Brian Weis wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Apr 6, 2011, at 5:46 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Getting a new application (such as the rtr protocol)
>>>>>>>>>> specifying hmac-md5 mandatory to implement through a Secdir
>>>>>>>>>> review and then the Security ADs just won't happen. The
>>>>>>>>>> only exception I can think of is if there were no possible
>>>>>>>>>> alternatives, and that's obviously not the case here.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> with AO not implemented on any servers, routers not having
>>>>>>>>> ssh libraries, and this being a server to router protocol,
>>>>>>>>> what are the alternatives?
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> randy
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I'm surprised IPsec hasn't been mentioned in this thread ...
>>>>>>>> was it previously discussed and rejected? Correct me if I'm
>>>>>>>> wrong, but I believe it's common for BGP routers to support
>>>>>>>> IPsec and servers definitely support IPsec. On the router side,
>>>>>>>> one or two IPsec sessions to servers should not be a burden.
>>>>>>>> I'm less sure of the server IPsec scaling properties, but I
>>>>>>>> would expect a LINUX or BSD kernel to have the scaling issues
>>>>>>>> as were discussed earlier in this thread regarding SSH but I'm
>>>>>>>> no expert here.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Brian
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> A few years ago we were told by vendors that many router
>>>>>>> implementations of IPsec were available only to traffic passing
>>>>>>> through a router, not to the control plane terminating in a
>>>>>>> router. Unless that has changed, IPsec is not a good candidate
>>>>>>> here.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> FWIW, that was an artifact of the IPsec requirements for routers.
>>>>>> 4301 has the following requirements:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> (end sec 4.1, RFC 4301): In summary,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> a) A host implementation of IPsec MUST support both transport and
>>>>>> tunnel mode.  This is true for native, BITS, and BITW
>>>>>> implementations for hosts.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> b) A security gateway MUST support tunnel mode and MAY support
>>>>>> transport mode.  If it supports transport mode, that should be used
>>>>>> only when the security gateway is acting as a host, e.g., for
>>>>>> network management, or to provide security between two intermediate
>>>>>> systems along a path.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> A gateway acts as a host for all its routing protocol connections,
>>>>>> and thus its control plane should have to comply with (a).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I agree, that's why IPsec isn't a good choice to protect BGP, but
>>>>>> we sort of created that situation in 4301, AFAICT.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Joe
>>>>> 
>>>>> I won't quibble with that argument as far as protecting BGP. But for
>>>>> the "router-to-server" protocol described by this draft is actually
>>>>> acting as a host for the exchange.
>>>> 
>>>> Routers act as hosts for all routing protocol exchanges; that's not unique
>>>> to the router-server exchange.
>>>> 
>>>>> There are more router IPsec implementations that can protect the
>>>>> control plane now, and meeting the requirements above would likely be
>>>>> doable.
>>>> 
>>>> There are other potential reasons why IPsec may or may not be the best
>>>> choice, but I don't much care whether IPsec or TCP-AO is used; those are the
>>>> appropriate choices if you care that the transport protocol is protected.
>>>> 
>>>> Joe
>>>> 
>>>> 
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