Re: [Sidr] [OPSEC] pccw as17557 leak...

On Thu, 28 Feb 2008, Vishwas Manral wrote:

> Hi Sandra,
>
> Thanks for the reply. You put forward the all the points correctly and
> precisely.
>
> My concern is that, unlike the normal PKI model where the final output
> is to authenticate the user using the just the certificate, the
> Routing based model we are now talking about verifying just a small
> bit of information which is used for the BGP Best Path selection - the
> sanity of which we are trying to protect, and protecting just the
> Origin does not make sense in a malicious case at all. Though you may
> say that it protects in case the malicious person plays with the
> Origin attribute, it however does not protect much as with the same
> amount of effort a malicious person can still cause the same attacks.
> What increases is the over head in each of the domains to maintain the
> new PKI information.
>

(Yes, I know I already replied to this message, but to a different point 
and I wanted to keep them separate.)

When I say origination of route advertisements, I am not talking about the 
ORIGIN attribute in the BGP Update.

I am talking about an ISP that creates a BGP Update that has an AS_PATH 
containing only its AS number.  That is the point at which a route is 
first advertised into the BGP system.  I'm talking about an action, not a 
protocol field.

It is indeed possible for a route to modify attributes other than the 
AS_PATH.  But many of those (local preference, community strings, etc) 
have only local significance.  And as we have seen, bogus AS_PATHs have a 
whole lot of impact.

--Sandy

_______________________________________________
Sidr mailing list
Sidr@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr