Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - ENDS: 2016-06-14 (June 14 2016)

Matthias Waehlisch <m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de> Fri, 24 June 2016 07:57 UTC

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Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2016 09:55:38 +0200
From: Matthias Waehlisch <m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de>
To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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References: <yj9owpm8agia.wl%morrowc@ops-netman.net> <61339176-792E-4000-BBBD-D17D4962E249@tislabs.com> <E5A2A64E-429D-4E77-80EE-BA57B20AEBC8@tislabs.com> <alpine.WNT.2.00.1606161633470.6316@mw-PC> <m2d1n7yr8o.wl%randy@psg.com>
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Cc: sidr <sidr@ietf.org>, sidr chairs <sidr-chairs@ietf.org>, Sandra Murphy <sandy@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - ENDS: 2016-06-14 (June 14 2016)
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Thanks! No further comments from my side. Looing forward to publication.


Cheers
  matthias

On Fri, 24 Jun 2016, Randy Bush wrote:

> >   I read v09. No objections only minor comments:
> 
> i hacked in many of these changes, though i think most did not really
> change anything other than an alternate way of saying the same thing.
> but i just do not want to see this go on an on interminably.  and at
> least you reviewed it.  thanks!
> 
> randy
> 
> > 
> > line 102: BGPsec need*s* *to* be spoken only
> > 
> > line 104: s/by small edge routers/by resource constrained edge routers/
> > 
> > line 119: *see* [RFC4271]
> > 
> > line 159: s/..../etc./
> > 
> > lines 200-206 seem redudant to lines 208-213
> > 
> > line 202 s/smallish/resource constrained/
> > 
> > line 215: I don't know where the 84% comes from, I suppose it's just a 
> > more or less arbitrary illustration of "vast majority". I would remove 
> > the number.
> > 
> > line 234: I would be more explicit: "How this is used in routing is up 
> > to the operator's local policy, similar to origin validation [RFC6811]."
> > 
> > lines 243-250: This paragraph confused me. What about:
> > 
> > Operators should be aware that controlling Invalid announcements by 
> > local preference might be delusive. Local preference affects only routes 
> > to the same set of destinations. Consider having a Valid announcement 
> > from neighbor V for prefix 10.0.0.0/16 and an Invalid announcement for 
> > 10.0.66.0/24 from neighbor I. If the local policy on a router is 
> > configured to accept Invalid announcements, then both routes will be 
> > installed, no matter of the value of local preference.
> > 
> > (Btw, I suppose that routes to .666 will be discarded anyway ;)
> > 
> > line 252: It sounds that only edge routers are allowed to speak BGPsec. 
> > I would weaken and say "Validation of signed paths is usually deployed 
> > at the eBGP edge."
> > 
> > line 292: s/BGPSEC_Path/BGPsec_Path/
> > 
> > lines 288-295:  The paragraph seems to mix transparent operation and the 
> > question of validation. What about:
> > 
> > A route server is usually 'transparent'. To operate transparently in an 
> > environment in which the route server connects BGPsec-enabled peers, the 
> > route server needs to run BGPsec as well. This implies that the route 
> > server creates signatures per client including its own AS in the 
> > BGPsec_Path and the target ASes. However, increasing the AS hop count 
> > reduces the likelihood of best path selection. See 2.2.2 of 
> > [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. To overcome this problem, the route 
> > server uses pCount of zero to not increase the effective AS hop count.
> > 
> > Furthermore, a BGPsec-aware route server needs to validate the incoming 
> > BGPsec_Path but should not drop invalids. In case the client speaks 
> > BGPsec the route server should just forward updates to clients which 
> > then validate . In case the client does not speak BGPsec, the route 
> > server reconstructs the AS_PATH and may signal the validation outcome 
> > using communities.
> > 
> > line 300: s/Routers should default to this knob disallowing pCount 0./Routers should disallow pCount 0 by default./
> > 
> > line 346: I would rephrase: "Operators should deploy servers that 
> > provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to client routers."
>