Re: [sidr] Validation reconsidered and X.509v3 extension OIDs

Russ Housley <> Tue, 19 July 2016 12:44 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <>
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Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 08:43:00 -0400
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To: Rob Austein <>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] Validation reconsidered and X.509v3 extension OIDs
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Does this apply to the Certificate Policy OID too?  If memory is correct, the current CP has a normative pinter to RFC 3779.


On Jul 19, 2016, at 7:18 AM, Rob Austein <> wrote:

> Reminding the WG of an old issue I raised years ago for validation
> reconsidered which, as far as I know, has not yet been addressed.
> If we change the validation algorithm, we really should also change
> the object identifiers used in the X.509v3 extensions used to convey
> the resources.
> The reason for this is simple: the RFC 3779 validation algorithm has
> shipped, long since.  My implementation has been part of OpenSSL for
> the last decade, and while it's not enabled by default on all
> platforms, it is on some, and is available as a configuration option
> on others.  It is far too late to change this, that ship has sailed.
> So if we're talking about changing the validation algorithm now, we
> need to label the algorithm we're using, so that validation code knows
> which algorithm it's supposed to follow.  Otherwise, we'll get
> different validation results at different sites depending on which
> algorithm they're using this week, different routing decisions as a
> consequence, dogs and cats living together, mass hysteria.
> The solution to this is simple: change the extension OIDs.  X.509's
> "critical extension" mechanism will take care of the rest.
> This will require some kind of phase-in/phase-out process during which
> the new OIDs appear and the old OIDs vanish, and will require RP code
> to implement the new OIDs, but these are trivial issues given that the
> RP behavior has to change in any case, that being the point of the
> entire validation reconsidered exercise.
> Yes, this will be a bit painful, but I view it as in essence exposing
> a problem that already exists, rather than sweeping it under the rug.
> Sorry for reminding the WG of this yet again at what some may consider
> a late date, but I have raised this issue before, I just haven't
> (re)raised it in the last few months.
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