Re: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?

Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu> Wed, 20 April 2011 20:41 UTC

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Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2011 13:40:12 -0700
From: Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?
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On 4/11/2011 12:49 PM, Stephen Kent wrote:
> At 9:30 PM -0700 4/6/11, Brian Weis wrote:
>> On Apr 6, 2011, at 5:46 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
>>
>>>> Getting a new application (such as the rtr protocol) specifying
>>>> hmac-md5 mandatory to implement through a Secdir review and then the
>>>> Security ADs just won't happen. The only exception I can think of is
>>>> if there were no possible alternatives, and that's obviously not the
>>>> case here.
>>>
>>> with AO not implemented on any servers, routers not having ssh
>>> libraries, and this being a server to router protocol, what are the
>>> alternatives?
>>>
>>> randy
>>
>> I'm surprised IPsec hasn't been mentioned in this thread ... was it
>> previously discussed and rejected? Correct me if I'm wrong, but I
>> believe it's common for BGP routers to support IPsec and servers
>> definitely support IPsec. On the router side, one or two IPsec
>> sessions to servers should not be a burden. I'm less sure of the
>> server IPsec scaling properties, but I would expect a LINUX or BSD
>> kernel to have the scaling issues as were discussed earlier in this
>> thread regarding SSH but I'm no expert here.
>>
>> Brian
>
> A few years ago we were told by vendors that many router implementations
> of IPsec were available only to traffic passing through a router, not to
> the
> control plane terminating in a router. Unless that has changed, IPsec is
> not a good candidate here.

FWIW, that was an artifact of the IPsec requirements for routers. 4301 
has the following requirements:

(end sec 4.1, RFC 4301):
    In summary,

    a) A host implementation of IPsec MUST support both transport and
       tunnel mode.  This is true for native, BITS, and BITW
       implementations for hosts.

    b) A security gateway MUST support tunnel mode and MAY support
       transport mode.  If it supports transport mode, that should be
       used only when the security gateway is acting as a host, e.g., for
       network management, or to provide security between two
       intermediate systems along a path.

A gateway acts as a host for all its routing protocol connections, and 
thus its control plane should have to comply with (a).

I agree, that's why IPsec isn't a good choice to protect BGP, but we 
sort of created that situation in 4301, AFAICT.

Joe