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Re: [sidr] WGLC for draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility-03

Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> Fri, 18 November 2011 06:21 UTC

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References: <CAD6DA02.1C611%terry.manderson@icann.org> <p06240803cad6af1b0ce7@193.0.26.186> <7B40776F-D906-46DA-A788-C4E9C0E758A9@verisign.com> <p06240803cad951813fd9@193.0.26.186> <CB6FE413-BEC2-4910-AEEF-98D6EAFD4E83@verisign.com> <p06240802cadde494171b@128.89.89.6> <3F1388E3-A694-42C9-AE2F-F12BF15DC86F@verisign.com> <p06240811cade1873e723@128.89.89.6> <BDA75A7E-2B2D-44A5-A18F-2D7DA01DF3A2@verisign.com> <p06240808cadf618efaa8@128.89.89.6> <E9BAE21C-A8EF-4D07-90C1-E8A5FD7F00E7@verisign.com> <p06240803cae62a2b13af@128.89.89.129> <CAH1iCiotmm47yZ_S_JyY8a0cODPFcnLe-CUSbzjYm7fdPcZDkA@mail.gmail.com> <p06240801cae63c0d5322@172.20.1.65> <CAH1iCioh1em9KjhFq2vTijpAOogL4nnc5=k0Eg3NFejVVdACRQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 01:21:11 -0500
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From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] WGLC for draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility-03
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On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 12:50 PM, Brian Dickson
<brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> wrote:

> Here's the thing - if all-A chains continue to exist until Phase 4,
> _and_ fallback to Suite A is required, this is a downgrade-attack
> vulnerability.
>

It seems to me that as long as there are consumers of cert material
that can not do the 'new hotness' (B in your example) you will have to
make products in the 'old and busted' form. Once everyone can do 'new
hotness', there is a relatively short period of time required to kill
off 'old and busted'.

I don't think you can get away with not making 'old and busted' until
everyone is able to plan ball, eh?

-Chris

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