Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feasibility analysis? (was Re: RPKI and private keys)

Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> Mon, 14 May 2012 14:27 UTC

MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <CAL9jLabs4RtS-EsHP6DwtMbsQz6GJSCZrv24N118HMHYCDe_Sg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAH1iCiruThFzpef5u9NVt+3AokGnuFhq-GrbqEOkkKnVhav4zQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAL9jLab2XT-4NWr8KyHKOiQMTWqE5cTavmEr4Uw+S4zhrA=YLA@mail.gmail.com> <CAH1iCiq3so54pE9XBM5Bp13xaERbmShipmCg=ckEySiDsh5ZPQ@mail.gmail.com> <D7A0423E5E193F40BE6E94126930C4930B990A66A8@MBCLUSTER.xchange.nist.gov> <CAH1iCirMKm1TbtBzWSKy=vHGLdYHvbtnXcwO1G9aG00n3DXmyw@mail.gmail.com> <D7A0423E5E193F40BE6E94126930C4930B990A6710@MBCLUSTER.xchange.nist.gov> <D7A0423E5E193F40BE6E94126930C4930B990A6716@MBCLUSTER.xchange.nist.gov> <CABFLmSTVmEUMYZmXNkbhSac0_jb0o-2nPG2_58Si0SGmF0podA@mail.gmail.com> <D7A0423E5E193F40BE6E94126930C4930B985DEF48@MBCLUSTER.xchange.nist.gov> <24B20D14B2CD29478C8D5D6E9CBB29F60F70871E@Hermes.columbia.ads.sparta.com> <CAH1iCio4_PaLFACs_cDZRV9c3iYhn93XqCrQrR5PD48bpyM3BA@mail.gmail.com> <CAL9jLab0aSJBpQTtbNLq_qLbxwhXj7Y3-_aqZVeMPoTB5C8DTA@mail.gmail.com> <CAH1iCioDW_mBWNyMy8K-jOrjdNqtnpQjdneSvWdRg0NWLNYV3w@mail.gmail.com> <CAL9jLabs4RtS-EsHP6DwtMbsQz6GJSCZrv24N118HMHYCDe_Sg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 14 May 2012 10:27:34 -0400
Message-ID: <CAH1iCioSxfswyorBr8R+VpHCDcMqyA9QqYgog7C3wcoh17mRMw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
To: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="f46d044402be20265a04bfffe3d0"
Cc: "Sriram, Kotikalapudi" <kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov>, "Murphy, Sandra" <Sandra.Murphy@sparta.com>, "sidr wg list (sidr@ietf.org)" <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feasibility analysis? (was Re: RPKI and private keys)
Precedence: list

We can't do the crypto without HW on some of the routers involved in
deployment of bgpsec.

I've heard just about everyone say that, quite possibly including yourself.

One of the reasons for questioning the choice of crypto, is exploring the
feasibility of solutions which do not require on-router HW for doing
signing.

Brian

On Fri, May 11, 2012 at 9:23 PM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com
> wrote:

> On Fri, May 11, 2012 at 5:27 PM, Brian Dickson
> <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> wrote:
> > The argument that "we can't do the crypto without HW"
>
> i didn't see anyone say that though.
>

[sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feasibil… Brian Dickson
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Christopher Morrow
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Christopher Morrow
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Brian Dickson
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Brian Dickson
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Sriram, Kotikalapudi
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Brian Dickson
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Sriram, Kotikalapudi
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Murphy, Sandra
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Brian Dickson
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Christopher Morrow
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Murphy, Sandra
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Brian Dickson
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Brian Dickson
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Christopher Morrow
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Brian Dickson
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Christopher Morrow
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Christopher Morrow
Re: [sidr] Keys and algorithms for Updates - feas… Montgomery, Douglas
Re: [sidr] sidrKeys and algorithms for Updates - … Wes Hardaker