Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security
Russ White <russw@riw.us> Mon, 21 November 2011 16:57 UTC
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Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 11:57:42 -0500
From: Russ White <russw@riw.us>
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Cc: sidr@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security
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> o a significant portion of the internet's isps will not publish > peering and customer business relationships, You can't secure what you don't tell anyone about. Security is about allowing others to compare the current state against what the state should be. What you're asking for is to ask someone else to take some specific action for you without telling them what that action should be. An impossibility. > o ASs are not homogenous, A gives B local peering and international > transit in frankfurt, but B may have no relationship with A in > new york, or B may be A's customer in new york, and you will never > know (and you do not want to see how this is done if you are > anywhere near a meal) These can be accounted for in some of the systems that have been proposed in the past, or are now available. > o this is just a repeat of the non-sense which wasted years of time > of the last ietf attempt in this area, Which is a worse waste of time --designing a solution first, then fitting the requirements around it, or figuring out what the problem is, then thinking through possible solutions? :-) Russ
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Christopher Morrow
- [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Russ White
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Russ White
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Shane Amante
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Terry Manderson
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Terry Manderson
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Russ White
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Brian Dickson