Subject: Re: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?
From: Sandra Murphy <[email-masked]>
To: Uma Chunduri <[email-masked]>
Cc: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2011 16:42:50 -0400 (Eastern Daylight Time)
List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing <sidr.ietf.org>

On Fri, 3 Jun 2011, Uma Chunduri wrote:

>
>
....

>
> True, privacy through SSH is overkill but strong AUTH is *critical*, I feel:
>   - TCP-MD5 should not be considered (as it is any ways deprecated and it's MD5)
>   - TCP-AO has only slight advantage as it has less overhead than ipsec-AH even when
>     deployed with manual keys
>   - but it's better if it is "MUST support authentication of nodes with TCP-AO or ipsec-AH" because

Just to be sure:

Did you understand the part about implementations of TCP-AO and ipsec-AH 
not being available at present?

I.e., you recognize this forces a delay in implementation of the protocol 
(and accept the consequent impact on deployment of the RPKI)?

--Sandy, speaking as wg co-chair

>     as both support
>           - strong auth algos
>           - algo agility
>           - can be deployed with manual and auto key management
>            (auto key probably required eventually, once with lot of connections at
>             cache/global RPKI/server side and for automatic key
>             changes periodically)
>           - key changes for existing sessions
>
>    One would get flexibility with this.
>    Also Section 7 (page 16)
>    "It is assumed that the router and cache have exchanged keys out of band by some reasonably secured means"
>    This will be still applicable but only if TCP-AO/ipsce-AH are deployed with manual keys.
>
> 2 cents,
> -Uma
>
>
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