Re: [sidr] WG acceptance call for draft-ymbk-rpki-grandparenting

"Montgomery, Douglas" <dougm@nist.gov> Fri, 10 August 2012 05:46 UTC

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From: "Montgomery, Douglas" <dougm@nist.gov>
To: Byron Ellacott <bje@apnic.net>
Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2012 01:46:06 -0400
Thread-Topic: [sidr] WG acceptance call for draft-ymbk-rpki-grandparenting
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Cc: sidr wg <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] WG acceptance call for draft-ymbk-rpki-grandparenting
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Hi Byron,


On 8/10/12 1:18 AM, "Byron Ellacott" <bje@apnic.net> wrote:

>Hi Doug,
>
>On 10/08/2012, at 3:02 PM, Montgomery, Douglas wrote:
>
>> On 8/10/12 12:36 AM, "Byron Ellacott" <bje@apnic.net> wrote:
>> 
>>> If C has taken some action, LEA triggered or otherwise, that means the
>>> RPKI system no longer asserts that G's intent for packet delivery is
>>> true, then merely allowing G to issue an RPKI assertion does not
>>>prevent
>>> C from asserting whatever they like, too.  If a LEA requires C to issue
>>> an AS0 ROA 10.42.2.0/23, then creating an ASn ROA for the same prefix,
>>> same maxLength will not ensure packets are delivered correctly.
>> 
>> The way I understand
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-08, if there is
>>a
>> valid ROA that matches a route, and a valid AS0 ROA that also covers the
>> route, the route will be considered VALID.
>> 
>> AS0 ROAs don't "trump" other valid ROAs.
>
>Substitute "ASm" for "AS0" in my example.

It doesn't change the logic.    The validation algorithm basically
searches for a match first, only if one is not found is the issue of other
non-matching ROAs considered.  That being, if no match is found and their
exists at least one covering ROA, then the route is INVALID.

You can not change a VALID route to any other state by creating additional
valid ROAs.  You have to delete (revoke, etc) the valid matching ROAs to
achieve that. Creating a (covering) ROA can change an UNKNOW to an
INVALID.   


>
>I believe you're right about AS 0.  I was taking the first sentence of
>the Security Considerations of draft-ietf-idr-as0 [1] too literally; AS0
>ROAs are not entirely equivalent to BOAs, after all :-)
>
>(But this is sort of my point, the RPKI system's verification of right of
>use breaks down if you start certifying multiple people as having a
>simultaneous right to use resources :-)

The issues above can occur even when there is only a single issuer of such
ROAs.

While draft-ietf-idr-as0 and RFC6491 deal with what the semantics that a
single given AS0 ROA conveys, neither draft (maybe rightly so) goes into
the level of detail to note there might exist other valid ROAs that
contradict the semantics of a AS0 ROA.

I would agree on a weaker statement, that we should discuss and come to
some understanding about issues of consistency associated with overlapping
attestations from multiple levels of the resource hierarchy and/or a
single holder.  The current syntax of our objects and validation
algorithms allow considerable flexibility here.  If, and where policies
should curtail some of this flexibility is what we are discussing.


>
>  Byron
>
>[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-idr-as0
>

--
Doug Montgomery ­ Mgr. Internet & Scalable Systems Research / ITL / NIST








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