Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-10

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Wed, 07 December 2016 00:40 UTC

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Date: Tue, 06 Dec 2016 16:40:23 -0800
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Alvaro Retana <aretana@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-10
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alvaro,

> In thinking about this point some more…what about
> draft-ietf-sidr-slurm?  Isn’t that supposed to address the private
> space?
> 
> M4. Still in Section 7: “To prevent exposure of the internals of BGP
> Confederations [RFC5065], a BGPsec speaker which is a Member-AS of a
> Confederation MUST NOT sign updates sent to another Member-AS of the
> same Confederation.”  This is another case where the BGPSec spec says
> something different: Section 4.3. (Processing Instructions for
> Confederation Members) presents a mandatory mechanism that includes
> signing, but not necessarily validating.  BTW, if the updates are not
> signed, then the signed path would be broken, even if all the routers
> in the path support BGPSec, right?  Is that the recommendation?
> 
> it is common for a bgp confederation to include private ASs for which
> there can be no unique authorative router credentials in the rpki.
> hence i am suspicious of the protocol spec.

if a private-as router in confederation C signs from that as, others in
the confed C may (or may not) have the slurmy data.  but assuredly, when
that route finally makes its way out to the global internet, there will
be a signature in the path which no one can validate.

randy