Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID
Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> Fri, 04 November 2011 21:08 UTC
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Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 17:08:35 -0400
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From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
To: Eric Osterweil <eosterweil@verisign.com>
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Cc: sidr wg list <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID
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On Fri, Nov 4, 2011 at 3:05 PM, Eric Osterweil <eosterweil@verisign.com> wrote: >> you are correct, BGPsec tries to secure the BGP protocol against abuse, >> not protect the internet. the latter is a very worthy goal but a bit >> nebulous. of course an internet draft or two might clarify that. > > This seems like a very pedantic distinction. Having an AS' traffic routed through an invalid path seems like a BGP protocol abuse to me. So, in that language, it seems to me that this issue is in scope (i.e. if the path is to be protected, then subverting it is an abuse). > oops, also, still not randy, but... there are lots of ways to bend traffic in the wrong direction and still keep bgp data 'the same'. I'm not sure fixing traffic paths is doable in BGP. Do you see a way to do this in BGP? -chris
- [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Paul Hoffman
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID George, Wes
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Shane Amante
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID George, Wes
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Jen Linkova
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Eric Osterweil
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Eric Osterweil
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Geoff Huston
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Geoff Huston
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Shane Amante
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Shane Amante
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Eric Osterweil
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Sriram, Kotikalapudi
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent