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Re: [sidr] Key learning procedures in BGPsec?

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Thu, 02 February 2012 19:01 UTC

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Date: Thu, 02 Feb 2012 13:49:42 -0500
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] Key learning procedures in BGPsec?
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Brian,

Thanks, this helps a lot.

The fact that the goal of the design you offered is path feasibility,
vs. path traversed validation, was a critical missing element.


>Combined with the origin validation, you get everything you need.

not as per the WG charter and the requirements doc, which state that 
path feasibility approaches are not adequate.

>(Contrast this with the risk of exposed on-router private keys, where
>literally _any_ AS-path could be forged via the AS of that router,
>off-axis.)

Not quite true, as I explained in my analysis of your attack example.

Steve

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