Re: [sidr] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-21: (with COMMENT)

"Ben Campbell" <ben@nostrum.com> Tue, 17 January 2017 19:34 UTC

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From: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
To: "Sriram, Kotikalapudi" <kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov>
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2017 13:34:40 -0600
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Subject: Re: [sidr] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-21: (with COMMENT)
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Thanks for the response. I have one remaining comment, below. I removed 
sections that I think are resolved.

Thanks!

Ben.

On 14 Jan 2017, at 11:23, Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed) wrote:

>>
>>  - 8.4, last paragraph: The text describes a replay attack, and 
>> delegates
>>  the mitigation solution to. This is an
>>  informational reference; it draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover
>> seems like it should be normative.
>
> The solution for mitigation of replay attacks is out of band
> (in relation to the BGPsec protocol).
> As I see it, draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover proposes 'a way'
> of replay attack mitigation. Techniques for key rollover /
> replay attack mitigation are expected to continue to evolve.
> There are various variants of the basic key rollover technique that
> are discussed in this informational draft:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sriram-replay-protection-design-discussion-07
> What needs to be pointed out in the BGPsec specification is that
> there are solutions available for replay attack mitigation.
> The above are the reasons why
> draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover is included in informational 
> references.

That is a reasonable response, if you think it is realistic that people 
would implement solutions other than the one in the reference. It would 
help if the text were more clear that draft-ietf-sider-bgpsec rollover 
is an example of a possible solutions, and other solutions are possible.