Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Mon, 18 June 2012 02:47 UTC

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Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 11:47:48 +0900
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Shane Amante <shane@castlepoint.net>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops
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shane,

going through the mailbox to pick up any un-addressed issues, i came
across your comment

> what I've been attempting to ask here is how one configures, in one's
> _local_ RPKI cache (that syncs to the outside world), /where/ the
> RIR's publication points are on Day 1.  Do I contact one RIR (which
> maintains a list of other RIR's publication points) -or- each RIR
> individually to ask what is their publication point?  (If you can help
> provide an answer as to what is the expectation on the operator, I can
> then potentially help to provide text).

i think there are a number of issues here

  o the general issue of how one gets trusted trust anchor(s),
    presumably out of band.  this problem is not unique to the rpki, so
    maybe we can get some help/clue here from the four or five steves in
    the group.

  o i do not see a reason to trust TAs shipped with software any more
    than TAs from any other random source.

  o one hopes that the current pathetic joke of having five RIR TAs will
    pass.  there is a long history of failing to really 'solve' a layer
    nine cf at layers seven and below.

  o the answer "iana will publish the root ta and sign it with their pgp
    key" may be a bit too glib because ...

  o we have an analogous problem for the operator who wants to use the
    global rpki, an lta rpki, and a private ta for 1918 or whatever.
    especially if the lta is built by a third party.

but i think that all this bs boils down to how to distribute a TA out of
band.  all pkis have this problem, dnssec has this problem, ...  i would
love to hear from the steves on this.

randy