Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-04.txt

[Jay Borkenhagen <[e-mail]>]

Randy Bush writes:
 > at this afternoon's sidr ssion, i presented two open issue with
 > draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-04.txt
 > 
 > 1 - Should updates learned via iBGP be marked?
 > 
 > 2 - Should updates injected into BGP on this router be marked?
 > 
 > i think yes because:
 >   o i want support of incremental deployment
 >   o i do not want to find out I am announcing garbage when my neighbor$,1ry(Bs
 >     NOC calls, mis-originations should be stopped at the source
 > 
 > there was fear that, if used at other than edge routers, this allowed
 > creation of loops, as setting local pref etc, do.
 > 
 > i think there was general agreement that this was ok on edge routers
 > and the point of injection, as that is logically an edge router.
 > 
 > would like to see convergence on this


I could not hear the discussion in the room today because the utter
webex fail prevented my remote participation.  So let me ask about
today's discussion.

Pre-RPKI, an ibgp policy can manipulate attributes elsewhere than just
at ingress edge routers, and if the policy is broken it can result in
loops.  It's something to watch out for when designing a policy, but I
am thankful that this kind of flexibility exists, because not all
policies that manipulate attributes other than at ingress edges are
broken.

Regarding pfx-validate: 

I hope the agreement in the room was that a sane network design would
probably involve setting a local 'origin has been checked' community
on the first router inside the AS where that check occurred.

I hope the agreement was _not_ that pfx-validate implementations
should be hard-coded to assess validation state only at the ingress
edge router.