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Wed, 04 Jan 2017 19:55:03 +0000; 1483559703.317 Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2017 19:54:37 +0000 (UTC) From: "Mehmet Adalier (Antara Teknik)" To: Sean Turner , Stephen Farrell Message-ID: <1671316103.6220736.1483559677229@mail.yahoo.com> In-Reply-To: <58B64FA8-7891-4D84-940B-AB737C3A76D1@sn3rd.com> References: <148353798879.13011.5291414579598073386.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <58B64FA8-7891-4D84-940B-AB737C3A76D1@sn3rd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_6220735_1764543738.1483559677222" Archived-At: Cc: "draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol@ietf.org" , "sidr-chairs@ietf.org" , The IESG , "m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de" , "sidr@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [sidr] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-21: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17 Precedence: list Reply-To: "Mehmet Adalier \(Antara Teknik\)" List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2017 19:57:50 -0000 ------=_Part_6220735_1764543738.1483559677222 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable while i would also like to see less use of=C2=A0sha-1 in new network protoc= ols... limiting the SKI length to a fixed 20 bytes is not really a bad idea for im= plementation efficiency and interoperability. as Sean points out, rfc7093's straight forward (leftmost 160 bits --20bytes= ) of a SHA-2 algorithm digest works well for the use of a hash value in thi= s particular context (generating Key Identifiers).. mA From: Sean Turner To: Stephen Farrell =20 Cc: sidr-chairs@ietf.org; draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol@ietf.org; The IES= G ; m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de; sidr@ietf.org Sent: Wednesday, January 4, 2017 10:48 AM Subject: Re: [sidr] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pr= otocol-21: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) =20 > On Jan 4, 2017, at 08:53, Stephen Farrell wro= te: >=20 > Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for > draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-21: Discuss >=20 > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this > introductory paragraph, however.) >=20 >=20 > Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. >=20 >=20 > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol/ >=20 >=20 >=20 > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > DISCUSS: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >=20 >=20 >=20 > I have a couple of fairly straightforward things I'd > like to briefly discuss... >=20 > (1) 3.2/Figure 7: A fixed 20 byte SKI being a sha-1 hash > of the public key is a bad plan, for all the usual > reasons. Why is it ok for that to be hardcoded here when > it could change if/when new alg choices are made for the > RPKI? If it is not too late then I think you should add a > length or alg field to that. If it is too late to do that, > then are we really ok that you will need to rev the BGPsec > version number in order to get rid of all sha-1 code from > your implementation? That seems like a bad plan for a new > protocol. Not sure it absolutely needs a length field; if the RPKI does ever decide t= o change to another hash algorithm for SKI, e.g., SHA-256/384/512, or to ch= ange to a hash of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo they could always the procedures= from https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7093/ to generate the values for = a 20-byte value.=C2=A0=20 spt _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr =20 ------=_Part_6220735_1764543738.1483559677222 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
while i would also like to see less use of sha-1 in new network protocols...

limiting the SKI length to a fixed 20 bytes is not = really a bad idea for implementation efficiency and interoperability.
=

as Sean points o= ut, rfc7093's straight forward (leftmost 160 bits --20bytes) of a SHA-2 alg= orithm digest works well for the use of a hash value in this particular con= text (generating Key Identifiers)..

mA
From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com><= br> To: Stephen Farrell &l= t;stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
C= c: sidr-chairs@ietf.org; draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol@ietf.or= g; The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>; m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de; sidr@ietf.org<= br> Sent: W= ednesday, January 4, 2017 10:48 AM

<= br clear=3D"none">> On Jan 4, 2017, at 08:53, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
> Stephen Farrell has entered the foll= owing ballot position for
> draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pro= tocol-21: Discuss
>
> When respo= nding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut = this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>
>
> Please refer to <= a shape=3D"rect" href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criter= ia.html" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-crit= eria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUS= S and COMMENT positions.
>
> > The document, along with other ballot positions, can b= e found here:
> ht= tps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol/
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------= ----------
> DISCUSS:
> ---------= -------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> I have a couple of fairly straightforward things I'd
> like to briefly discuss...
>
> (1) 3.2/Figure 7: A fixed 20 byte SKI being a sha-1 hash
> of the public key is a bad plan, for all the usual
> reasons. Why is it ok for that to be hardcoded here when
> it could change if/when new alg choices are made for the> RPKI? If it is not too late then I think you should ad= d a
> length or alg field to that. If it is too late t= o do that,
> then are we really ok that you will need = to rev the BGPsec
> version number in order to get rid= of all sha-1 code from
> your implementation? That se= ems like a bad plan for a new
> protocol.

Not sure it absolutely needs a length field; if th= e RPKI does ever decide to change to another hash algorithm for SKI, e.g., = SHA-256/384/512, or to change to a hash of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo they co= uld always the procedures from https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc= /rfc7093/ to generate the values for a 20-byte value. 

spt

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