Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID

[Geoff Huston <[e-mail]>]

On 10/11/2011, at 5:33 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:

> At 3:09 PM +1100 11/5/11, Geoff Huston wrote:
>> On 05/11/2011, at 12:34 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
>> 
>>>> I think the distinction between a leak and something more intentional
>>>> s a matter of policy.  Knowing the policy associated with the
>>>> adjacencies that an AS is leaking over would allow leaked
>>>> announcements to be identified
>>> 
>>> o We can not know intent, should Mary have announced the prefix to Bob
>> 
>> 
>> I disagree with this assertion of impossibility. The intention of the routing
>> policy databases in their various flavours and incarnations was to publish
>> intent and allow others to filter based on intent.
> 
> Geoff,
> 
> I have been told that the lack of widely available, reliable IRR data 
> out side of the RIPE region is due, in part, to a reluctance by 
> operators to publish all of these details.  If that is true, then it 
> argues against assuming the existence of such data on a global basis.
> 
> Steve

I did not claim it existed - I merely disagreed with the claim of its 
impossibility of existence.

In the same way that the only way you can eliminate the "unknown" validation
outcome is to achieve universal adoption of the generation of credentials,
the general visibility of intent relies on universal adoption on the generation
of routing policy. It is not impossible per se, it just relies on universal adoption!

In the case of the efforts relating to RPSL, reality has not achieved such targets
of universal adoption, as you point out.

In the case of the efforts relating to the BGP security mechanisms you are working
on, it is an open issue as to how many folk would adopt it, but our experiences
of other technologies, including 4 byte ASN support indicate that universal
adoption is an extremely challenging objective.
 

Geoff