Re: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?

[Joe Touch <[e-mail]>]

Hi, Tom,

On 4/25/2011 1:47 AM, t.petch wrote:
....
> I think that the point is not that it is or is not a BGP connection
> but that security for BGP was predicated on the assumption that
> the TCP connection would be short in terms of hops, ie none,
> and it was that that made a less stringent approach to security
> acceptable, one that would not be acceptable for an Internet
> wide access for - say - a Web site.

Hopcount security, i.e., GTSM (RFC 3682) is not at all related to TCP-AO.

TCP-AO provides replay protection, includes extended sequence numbers to 
account for seqno rollover, and support for changing keys during a 
connection without impact to TCP. It also uses per-connection keys 
derived from master keys.

> What I am missing is not whether or not this is BGP, but
> whether or not the connection will have the properties of
> BGP, of being very short.   My suspicion is that the
> data will be coming from all over the place, Internet-wide
> (as with CRL) and so the security should be Web-like and not
> BGP-like; ie TCP-AO will not do.

I encourage you to take another look at TCP-AO; there is nothing therein 
that is focused exclusively on any property of BGP. It was intended as a 
generic mechanism to support transport authentication for TCP connections.

Joe