Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs

"Montgomery, Douglas" <dougm@nist.gov> Tue, 13 January 2015 00:10 UTC

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From: "Montgomery, Douglas" <dougm@nist.gov>
To: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>, "George, Wes" <wesley.george@twcable.com>
Thread-Topic: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs
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Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2015 00:09:31 +0000
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References: <52D072F6.9030304@ops-netman.net> <52D0A0AC.5040903@ops-netman.net> <CF07E61E.AF86%wesley.george@twcable.com> <CAHw9_iL94_h7xyncvsbpxrmNMdH2jLJV5-ir5tdpnVUVidEwnQ@mail.gmail.com> <D0D9C5D9.30107%dougm@nist.gov>
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Cc: "draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs@tools.ietf.org>, sidr wg list <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs
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Terribly sorry about that … ignore the post below.

An odd search / view through my mailbox made me think this was a recent
comment.

I was not trying to resurrect the discussion below.

Sorry about that.

dougm
— 
Doug Montgomery, Mgr Internet & Scalable Systems Research @  NIST/ITL/ANTD





On 1/12/15, 7:02 PM, "Montgomery, Douglas" <dougm@nist.gov> wrote:

>I doubt that using such vague / loose terms as “business relationship
>conformance” helps matters.
>
>Actually 3.22 is a bit loose in the use of the word “intended”.
>
>"3.22  A BGPsec design SHOULD NOT presume to know the intent of the
>         originator of a NLRI, nor that of any AS on the AS Path, other
>         than that they intended to pass it to the next AS in the Path.”
>
>
>I highly suspect that the same misconfigurations that can result in route
>leaks today, could result in BGPsec signed route leaks (I.e., not what was
>intended) tomorrow.
>
>
>One might try the following for 3.22 to both fix the above and address
>Wes’s concerns.
>
>3.22 A BGPsec design SHOULD NOT presume to know the intent of the
>originator of a NLRI, nor that of any AS on the AS Path, other
>than that they announced the NLRI explicitly to the next AS in the Path.
>In particular there is no BGPsec requirement that the PATH for a given
>NLRI 
>is consistent with the set of local routing or filtering policies of the
>sender, 
>receiver or any AS along the PATH."
>
>That might kill two birds … or scare the whole flock from the trees.
>dougm
>— 
>Doug Montgomery, Mgr Internet & Scalable Systems Research @  NIST/ITL/ANTD
>
>
>
>
>
>On 1/24/14, 10:04 AM, "Warren Kumari" <warren@kumari.net> wrote:
>
>>On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 9:56 AM, George, Wes <wesley.george@twcable.com>
>>wrote:
>>> I’ve reviewed, it’s mostly ready, minor comments:
>>>
>>> I’m not happy with this text in the intro: “issues of business
>>>    relationship conformance, of which routing 'leaks' are a subset,
>>>    while quite important to operators (as are many other things), are
>>>    not security issues per se, and are outside the scope of this
>>>    document.”
>>>
>>
>>Would simply:
>>"issues of business relationship conformance (of which routing 'leaks'
>>are a subset), while important to operators, are outside the scope of
>>this document.”
>>
>>cover things well enough?
>>
>>> Let me be clear up front, my issue is *not* that these are declared out
>>>of
>>> scope, since my comments on the threats document seemed to be
>>>interpreted
>>> otherwise.
>>>
>>> My issue with this text is the reason it provides as to why they’re
>>> considered out of scope. I don’t think that it’s entirely accurate to
>>> assert that route leaks are not security issues. While not all route
>>>leaks
>>> are security issues, some are. It would be more accurate to reflect the
>>> discussion that led us to the conclusion that we can’t secure them
>>>because
>>> we don’t know what “them” is yet, and are awaiting GROW to define them
>>>in
>>> such a way so that we can evaluate if it’s even possible to secure them
>>>in
>>> this framework. That may be a longer discussion that doesn’t belong in
>>>the
>>> intro, I don’t know.
>>>
>>
>>I suspect it is. It somewhat seems like a non-terminating discussion....
>>
>>W
>>> Also I think the parenthetical “as are many other things" is
>>>unnecessary
>>> and clunky.
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Wes
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/10/14, 8:38 PM, "Chris Morrow" <morrowc@ops-netman.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>Working Group Folken,
>>>>Today starts a WGLC for the subject draft:
>>>>  <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs>
>>>>
>>>>Abstract:
>>>>   This document describes requirements for a BGP security protocol
>>>>   design to provide cryptographic assurance that the origin AS had the
>>>>   right to announce the prefix and to provide assurance of the AS Path
>>>>   of the announcement.
>>>>
>>>>Please have a read-through and send comments at the authors +
>>>>sidr@ietf.org mailing list.
>>>>
>>>>This WGLC completes in 1,209,600 seconds, or 20,160 minutes.
>>>>
>>>>Thanks!
>>>>
>>>>-chris
>>>>co-chair
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>
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