Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-13's security guarantees

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Tue, 15 September 2015 01:12 UTC

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Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2015 07:12:16 +0600
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Cc: "sidr@ietf.org" <sidr@ietf.org>, David Mandelberg <david@mandelberg.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-13's security guarantees
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> In the example with -- > A --> B --> C --> D -->, if B and C (the ones
> that were signing but not verifying) return to the update to verify,
> then they will realize that the update they last signed (for the
> prefix) was invalid, and will propagate an alternate valid signed
> announcement or send a withdrawal message to D.

and all the packts will return to their origins with a loud swoosh and
re-route correctly :)

> At this point, B and C have taken their corrective action.

not really.  the internet is all about the data plane.  the control
plane is there to help the data plane.

randy