Re: [sidr] two stranded docuemnts - stake time

[Tim Bruijnzeels <[e-mail]>]

Hi Randy,

I did. Thank you very much.

Do you think that a notice to law enforcement about how this action would be ineffective and counter-productive has a place in your analysis? Something along the lines of what I suggested earlier:

    Law enforcement would be ill-advised to take this cause of action as it will degrade the trust that
    operators place in the global RPKI. Not only can operators use local policy to circumvent the "bogus"
    objects - making it an ineffective measure, abuse of this power will also lead to operators choosing
    not to use RPKI at all. This in turn will mean that critical internet infrastructure will remain
    vulnerable to hijacks.

I never denied that there will be some in LEA that look at RPKI as a knob to control routing. But rather than raising this as a given and misquoting a different incident as legal precedence (which again it just isn't in the legal sense - freezing contact data is a far cry from changing routing), it would be much better if the analysis made it very clear to LEAs that this is a very bad idea in the first place.

They really should care more about protecting critical infrastructure, governmental, military and civil - where a lot more is to be lost in security and economic damages if the technical community turns away from this technology, than there is to be gained by black-holing some traffic - ineffectively and temporarily.

And to operators it should be clear that the use of local policy or exceptions (e.g. SLURM) can be used to easily circumvent such actions.

Tim



> On 01 Aug 2016, at 18:40, Randy Bush <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> you may, or may not, notice that the current i-d does not mention
> ripe/ncc
> 
> randy