[sidr] Ben Campbell's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07: (with COMMENT)

Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> Tue, 03 April 2018 19:43 UTC

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From: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
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Date: Tue, 03 Apr 2018 12:43:24 -0700
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Subject: [sidr] Ben Campbell's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07: (with COMMENT)
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Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07: No Objection

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Major Comments:

§6: I also agree with Benjamin's sadness about the security considerations. The
section really should at least discuss the potential consequences of an
adversary inserting a false slurm file, modifying one on the fly, or
eavesdropping on one.

Minor Comments:

§1.1: The document contains at least a few lower case instances of "must".
Please consider using the boilerplate from RFC 8174.

§3.3, 1st paragraph: "RP SHOULD verify that the target is an acceptable value"
What is the criteria for acceptability?

§8.2, " [RFC4648]": The document requires Base64 encoding. Doesn't that make
this a normative reference?

Editorial Comments and Nits:

 [significant] Abstract (and throughout the document):

I don't find the term "local view of the RPKI" to be descriptive. IIUC, we are
talking about overriding assertions that come from the RPKI based on local (or
possibly 3rd party) knowledge. This seems to me to be a different thing than
providing a "local view of the RPKI", and I certainly would not have gotten a
sense of that difference from the Abstract alone, and possibly not the

§1, last paragraph: Please expand or define rpki-rtr on first mention.

§3.4.1: Please expand SKI on first mention. (You do so in the second mention
:-) )