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Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07

Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> Mon, 13 March 2017 12:47 UTC

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Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 08:47:11 -0400
From: Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>
To: Declan Ma <madi@zdns.cn>
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References: <5821A5CF-EFF8-4CE3-9AA4-CFDB9C903D63@cisco.com> <20170311222527.324125ACF21@minas-ithil.hactrn.net> <yj9ok27upcws.wl%morrowc@ops-netman.net> <6359B4B1-478D-4017-B259-7B60BA55FF39@zdns.cn>
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Cc: Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, "sidr-chairs@ietf.org" <sidr-chairs@ietf.org>, "sidr@ietf.org" <sidr@ietf.org>, Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>, "draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07
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At Mon, 13 Mar 2017 14:16:59 +0800, Declan Ma wrote:
...
> It seems to me that the only concern on OID is about using OPENSSL
> to get resource sets for further validation process. If the WG has
> decided to deprecate the original by using the Validation
> Reconsidered, why bother to bring a new OID ? 

Because library code which thinks it understands RFC 3779 has been
shipping for a decade now, and the WG has no magic wand which can make
that library code go away.  It is very poor form to retroactively
change the semantics of something that has already shipped, at least
when there is an easy way to avoid the problem, as there is here.

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