[sidr] Warren Kumari's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> Sun, 01 April 2018 21:02 UTC
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From: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
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Date: Sun, 01 Apr 2018 14:02:51 -0700
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Subject: [sidr] Warren Kumari's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Warren Kumari has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07: Discuss When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-slurm/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- DISCUSS: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- I don't understand the targeting as it related to domain/host names (and suspect that others will have the same issue). >From section 3.3: " If a "slurmTarget" element is present, an RP SHOULD verify that the target is an acceptable value, and reject this SLURM file if the "slurmTarget" element is not acceptable.... Accordingly, the SLURM file source needs to indicate which RP(s) should make use of the file by adding the domain name(s) of the RP(s) to the SLURM file target... Such a target value is a server name expressed in FQDN. "slurmTarget": [ { "hostname": "rpki.example.com", "comment": "This file is intended for RP server rpki.example.com" } ] So, if I want to target multiple RPs (rpki1.example.com, rpki2.example.com) can I do: "slurmTarget": [ { "hostname": "example.com", "comment": "This file is intended for RP server rpki.example.com" } ] ? The "domain names(s)" versus "hostname" vs "server name expressed in FQDN" text is handwavey. I'm assuming that I'd need to do: "slurmTarget": [ { "hostname": "rpki1.example.com", "comment": "This file is intended for RP server rpki1.example.com" }, { "hostname": "rpki2.example.com", "comment": "This file is intended for the RP server, rpki2.example.com" }, ]" Can you please make this clearer, and hopefully add more targets to the examples? This seems like an easy fix / clarification, happy to clear once it is, er, clear. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- I have a few questions and editorial comments: 1: Section Abstract: ISPs can also be able to use the RPKI to validate the path of a BGP route. I think you meant "ISPs can also use the RPKI..." 2: Section 1. Introduction "However, an "RPKI relying party" (RP) may want to override some of the information expressed via putative Trust Anchor(TA) and the certificates downloaded from the RPKI repository system." I think this should be either "a putative Trust Anchor (TA)" or "putative Trust Anchors (TA)" (single vs plurals). I agree with others that "putative TA" is not a well known term - perhaps you can find a better one? Section 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters In the "prefixFilters examples", I think it would be helpful to update the comments to be more explicit about what is being matched (e.g"All VRPs covered by 198.51.100.0/24 and matching AS 64497")