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Re: [sidr] wg adoption call for draft-ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying-00.txt

Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org> Wed, 28 March 2012 09:05 UTC

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Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 05:05:43 -0400
From: Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] wg adoption call for draft-ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying-00.txt
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Have read and support adoption.  I like the general idea.  I don't 
have comments on the particular wrappings chosen.

Minor comments:

It might be better to not specify the cryptosuite(s) in use -- aren't 
those documented in draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs?  (ECDSA is named in 
sections 1 and 4.)

The current security considerations section seems applicable only to 
the operator-generated model.  You might want to say something about 
the other model.  And for the operator-generated model, you may want 
to add a (flip) comment about transport security being "keep your hand 
on the USB key".  This almost looks like a use for Resurrecting 
Duckling keying methods.

-- Sam

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