Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID

[Stephen Kent <[e-mail]>]

Danny,

I'm reducing my reply to minimize what has become a tedious process.

...

>The charter is temporal and the product of the WG in the form of RFCs
>will be much more persistent, I'm concerned by a line of reasoning that
>says "Let's ignore and not even enumerate or concern ourselves with
>these obvious threats because the current charter [deliberately] says
>all we have to do is provide semantic validation of the AS_PATH" [and
>doing anything more would quite possibly NOT be conducive to
>expedited publication of BGPSEC].

While I appreciate your concerns, comments from one WG member do not 
warrant changing the scope of a document to extend beyond the WG 
charter. When the charter changes, or upon direction of the WG chairs 
I will revise the doc.

>...
>And I'm saying that if we're going to employ a PKI solution on a distributed
>loosely coherent resource certification infrastructure that's going 
>to be employed
>by RPs in a non-determinsitc manner and result in "periodic updates" in the
>routing system in order to minimize exposure windows, then we ought to look
>at what architectural approaches can be considered or what new elements
>invented to minimize unneeded state and churn in the network and maximize
>resiliency without introducing the possibly for any array of new attacks.

Feel free to propose such mechanisms.

>We've already seen issues where such an approach has been problematic with
>DNSSEC in the wake of portions of the Internet being fragmented and causing
>issues and inability to update certificates in the system at root, TLD and SLD
>levels, and what you're proposing here is far far more troubling.

Can you point me to reports on those incidents. I have not heard about them.

...

>If you're intended to play the "charter says .." card then we're 
>wasting our time.

Yes, we are both wasting our time at this stage.

Steve