Re: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?

[Christopher Morrow <[e-mail]>]

On Fri, Apr 22, 2011 at 12:14 AM, Joe Touch <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>
> On Apr 21, 2011, at 7:45 PM, Christopher Morrow <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> So.. round and round the rosemary bush we go, still we have no actual
>> things that run actual tcp-ao, so given that can we either:
>>
>> 1) use md5 (as a MUST, with ssh as a MAY) and rev the doc at a later
>> point to say that AO is a MUST and remove md5
>> 2) move this doc along the path
>> 3) get implementations of the protocol today to start using md5
>
> You could instead do what the TCP-AO rfc recommends for apps like BGP:
>
> - MUST support TCP-AO
> - MAY also support TCP MD5 for backward compatibility
>
> This avoids reinventing an answer for BGP caches and just applies the *current* advice for BGP in general.
>

bgp cache is not bgp... it's really just a random tcp session from a
router to a thing some where else.

(does that change your proposed above?)

-Chris

> Joe
>
>
>>
>> -chris
>> (co-chair-toe-socks-on)
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 20, 2011 at 8:25 PM, Joe Touch <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 4/20/2011 5:19 PM, Brian Weis wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Apr 20, 2011, at 1:40 PM, Joe Touch wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 4/11/2011 12:49 PM, Stephen Kent wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> At 9:30 PM -0700 4/6/11, Brian Weis wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Apr 6, 2011, at 5:46 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Getting a new application (such as the rtr protocol)
>>>>>>>>> specifying hmac-md5 mandatory to implement through a Secdir
>>>>>>>>> review and then the Security ADs just won't happen. The
>>>>>>>>> only exception I can think of is if there were no possible
>>>>>>>>> alternatives, and that's obviously not the case here.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> with AO not implemented on any servers, routers not having
>>>>>>>> ssh libraries, and this being a server to router protocol,
>>>>>>>> what are the alternatives?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> randy
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm surprised IPsec hasn't been mentioned in this thread ...
>>>>>>> was it previously discussed and rejected? Correct me if I'm
>>>>>>> wrong, but I believe it's common for BGP routers to support
>>>>>>> IPsec and servers definitely support IPsec. On the router side,
>>>>>>> one or two IPsec sessions to servers should not be a burden.
>>>>>>> I'm less sure of the server IPsec scaling properties, but I
>>>>>>> would expect a LINUX or BSD kernel to have the scaling issues
>>>>>>> as were discussed earlier in this thread regarding SSH but I'm
>>>>>>> no expert here.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Brian
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A few years ago we were told by vendors that many router
>>>>>> implementations of IPsec were available only to traffic passing
>>>>>> through a router, not to the control plane terminating in a
>>>>>> router. Unless that has changed, IPsec is not a good candidate
>>>>>> here.
>>>>>
>>>>> FWIW, that was an artifact of the IPsec requirements for routers.
>>>>> 4301 has the following requirements:
>>>>>
>>>>> (end sec 4.1, RFC 4301): In summary,
>>>>>
>>>>> a) A host implementation of IPsec MUST support both transport and
>>>>> tunnel mode.  This is true for native, BITS, and BITW
>>>>> implementations for hosts.
>>>>>
>>>>> b) A security gateway MUST support tunnel mode and MAY support
>>>>> transport mode.  If it supports transport mode, that should be used
>>>>> only when the security gateway is acting as a host, e.g., for
>>>>> network management, or to provide security between two intermediate
>>>>> systems along a path.
>>>>>
>>>>> A gateway acts as a host for all its routing protocol connections,
>>>>> and thus its control plane should have to comply with (a).
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree, that's why IPsec isn't a good choice to protect BGP, but
>>>>> we sort of created that situation in 4301, AFAICT.
>>>>>
>>>>> Joe
>>>>
>>>> I won't quibble with that argument as far as protecting BGP. But for
>>>> the "router-to-server" protocol described by this draft is actually
>>>> acting as a host for the exchange.
>>>
>>> Routers act as hosts for all routing protocol exchanges; that's not unique
>>> to the router-server exchange.
>>>
>>>> There are more router IPsec implementations that can protect the
>>>> control plane now, and meeting the requirements above would likely be
>>>> doable.
>>>
>>> There are other potential reasons why IPsec may or may not be the best
>>> choice, but I don't much care whether IPsec or TCP-AO is used; those are the
>>> appropriate choices if you care that the transport protocol is protected.
>>>
>>> Joe
>>>
>>>
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>