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Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07

Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net> Mon, 13 March 2017 14:16 UTC

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Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 10:15:58 -0400
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From: Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>
To: Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>
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Cc: Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, "sidr@ietf.org" <sidr@ietf.org>, "sidr-chairs@ietf.org" <sidr-chairs@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-07
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At Mon, 13 Mar 2017 08:47:11 -0400,
Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> wrote:
> 
> At Mon, 13 Mar 2017 14:16:59 +0800, Declan Ma wrote:
> ...
> > It seems to me that the only concern on OID is about using OPENSSL
> > to get resource sets for further validation process. If the WG has
> > decided to deprecate the original by using the Validation
> > Reconsidered, why bother to bring a new OID ? 
> 
> Because library code which thinks it understands RFC 3779 has been
> shipping for a decade now, and the WG has no magic wand which can make
> that library code go away.  It is very poor form to retroactively
> change the semantics of something that has already shipped, at least
> when there is an easy way to avoid the problem, as there is here.

new oid's seemed reasonable to me... as a chemical engineer playing
security engineer on network things.

-chris

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