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Re: [sidr] Levels of BGPsec/RPKI validation, was: Re: [Idr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-11

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Tue, 05 May 2015 13:35 UTC

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Subject: Re: [sidr] Levels of BGPsec/RPKI validation, was: Re: [Idr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-11
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Iljitsch,
> On 30 Apr 2015, at 19:48, Matthew Lepinski<mlepinski.ietf@gmail.com>  wrote:
>
>> For path validation (as opposed to origin validation), the path validation algorithm returns one of two states. That is, either an update has a valid signed path or it doesn't. (We discussed previously in SIDR whether there was a useful third case for path validation, and the working group wasn't able to come up with one.)
> I think expired certificates qualifies. And a case can be made for strong crypto algo vs weak crypto algo is a fourth one.
I'm puzzled by the comment re crypto strength. We don't have the TLS 
situation where there
are lots of alg suites. We have one suite, and a well-documented (RFC 
6915) process for
transitioning to a next suite.

Steve

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