Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security

[Christopher Morrow <[e-mail]>]

On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 12:40 AM, Jakob Heitz <[e-mail]> wrote:
> To make the route leak problem tractable, we need a definition.
> Here is my attempt:
>

danny's draft actually does a decent job of saying what a leak is (one
instance of a leak at least, which is fine), it just doesn't say how
you'd know that from 2 as-hops away... (today, with out bgp changes
and/or external knowledge about the ASes in the AS-Path)

<snip>

> When S sends a packet to D, that packet should traverse
> only ASs that S trusts OR that D trusts. If the packet
> traverses an AS that NEITHER S NOR D trusts, then a route
> leak has occurred.

how is this 'trust' known? how does it translate down the chain? I
don't trust AS9001 anymore than 4134 than 4366 than 3 ... I do happen
to fling packets through them though :(

> When a route announcement leaves the set of ASs trusted
> by its originator, Brian's "transit" bit turns off.

I doubt the originator trusts anyone except itself... and MAYBE it's transits.

why mix two topics? :( (also, how does the route know it crossed this
boundary and a bit needs flipping?)

-chris