Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs

Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> Mon, 05 May 2014 16:51 UTC

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Date: Mon, 05 May 2014 12:51:40 -0400
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From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs
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On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 12:41 PM, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> wrote:
>>>>>   3.14  While the trust level of a route should be determined by the
>>>>>         BGPsec protocol, local routing preference and policy MUST then
>>>>>         be applied to best path and other routing decisions.  Such
>>>>>         mechanisms SHOULD conform with [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
>>>>> ...
>>>>>   3.17  If a BGPsec design makes use of a security infrastructure, that
>>>>>         infrastructure SHOULD enable each network operator to select
>>>>>         the entities it will trust when authenticating data in the
>>>>>         security infrastructure.  See, for example,
>>>>>         [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
>>
>> What about adding that "the connection to this security infrastructure
>> MUST be through a secure channel"?

it's done via rcynic and/or rpki-to-rtr, right? depending on where in
the process you are... presuming the process looks like:
  publication-point - gatherer - cache - router
                      (rcynic)     (rcynic)   (rpki-rtr)


and above/before 'publication-point' is 'RIR tomfoolery'

> connection from what?  mains power?  :)

i think roque was referring to the above process...which I think
already includes 'security bits'. (rcynic == CMS, rpki-rtr == AO ||
ssh)

> this is about routers speaking bgpsec.  imiho, it would be ill-adviised
> to start down the rat-hole of operational practices of router management
> for which there is no proof of termination.

let's avoid that for now, especially since I think the request is
already taken care of.

If this is all satisfactory, let's get to a WGLC in the next 2 days,
and then see where that leads us?

-chris