Re: [sidr] Origin Ops, TALs and Local TAs

Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> Tue, 29 November 2011 00:53 UTC

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Subject: Re: [sidr] Origin Ops, TALs and Local TAs
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On Mon, Nov 28, 2011 at 5:13 PM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> At 10:09 PM -0500 11/21/11, Danny McPherson wrote:
>>
>> ...
>>  > I don't understand all of the words above.
>>
>> Apologies for the loose terminology here..  Try this..
>>
>> AS1 --- ISP1 (AS2) --- ISP2 (AS3) --- AS4
>>
>> In the case of LTA if these four parties wish to transact their
>> constraints files
>> (or shared "non-putative" RPKI TAs) must be familiar and synchronized with
>> each other via some out of band mechanism - i.e., they either have to:
>>
>> 1) synchronize LTA contents across the set
>> 2) share a common non-putative TA that magically does this
>>
>> and in doing so, they likely would want to constrain what a TA is allowed
>> to
>> assert,  via a constraints file, as noted above?
>>
>> That is, LTA for the local AS doesn't fix the
>> multi-AS/multi-administrator/RP
>> issue, and so some synchronization or shared non-putative TA needs to be
>> developed in they desire autonomy outside of the putative set.
>> Is that correct?
>
> The original model for an LTA was, as the name suggests, local, hence just
> one AS.  However, it is easy to extend that model to encompass a set of
> AS'es under the same admin control. In that case, the set of ASes all agree
> to accept the
> RPKI "view" managed by some entity in control (relative to the set of ASes).
>
> In your example are all of the ASes independent? You say that they want to
> "transact their constraints file" but you didn't say why, nor what the
> relationships might be among the constraints file for each AS.

I think danny's example (as explained off-line in taipei) was something like:

  o 3 cooperating ASNs (say: 701, 7018, 2914)
  o one customer on either side of the 3 ASNs (a-widget-maker &&
a-widget-user/customer)
  o All have RPKI + BGPSEC deployed
  o the 'blackhelicopters of forgotten payment' arrive at ARIN's
doorstep and remove the Registration data for a-root/24.

  For a-widget-customer to still access a-widget-maker all of the
intermediate ASN's (and a-widget-customer even) will have to enter
into their LTA's some bogus/temporary certificate data... Or, I
suppose, they could just wing it on 'not validated' but still the only
prefix-in-town?

I think Danny's proposing some federation of LTAs under distributed
control where these folks all agree that "a-widget-maker/24 is still
a-ok by us!".

-chris