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Re: [sidr] Levels of BGPsec/RPKI validation, was: Re: [Idr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-11

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Tue, 05 May 2015 20:59 UTC

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Subject: Re: [sidr] Levels of BGPsec/RPKI validation, was: Re: [Idr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-11
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Iljitsch,

The topic of partial path signing was explored in detail and rejected 
for a couple
of reasons.  It was way too complex to figure out how an AS could rely 
on partial path
sig info, and there appeared to be a lot of ways to exploit the new 
attack surfaces
created by partially signed paths.

Steve

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