Re: [sidr] Levels of BGPsec/RPKI validation, was: Re: [Idr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-11

Iljitsch van Beijnum <iljitsch@muada.com> Fri, 01 May 2015 19:58 UTC

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Subject: Re: [sidr] Levels of BGPsec/RPKI validation, was: Re: [Idr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-11
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On 01 May 2015, at 21:24, Matthew Lepinski <mlepinski.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> You are certainly correct that there are Nine possible states (and Randy's table is correct).

Randy's table? I must have missed that one.

> That being said, I have some concern about treating "Path Unsigned" differently than "Path Not Valid", since it is trivial for a malicious adversary to transform "Path Not Valid" into "Path Unsigned" if doing so will yield better treatment for some bad route.

That's a good point. But then, how do you treat those? By filtering the affected prefixes? You can only do that once _all_ paths are signed.

So basically, we're stuck with our AS path filters until BGPsec deployment hits 100%.

It would have been better if BGPsec would have had provisions for partial deployment, so that you can have a path that is partially BGPsec protected even if it can't be fully be BGPsec-protected. That way, the filtering issue shrinks in scope as the BGPsec-enabled core grows and non-BGPsec branches turn into leaves and finally go away.