[sidr] FW: question on SKI and router public key retrieval in signature attribute in BGPSEC

"Murphy, Sandra" <Sandra.Murphy@sparta.com> Wed, 14 March 2012 17:16 UTC

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From: "Murphy, Sandra" <Sandra.Murphy@sparta.com>
To: "sidr@ietf.org" <sidr@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [sidr] question on SKI and router public key retrieval in signature attribute in BGPSEC
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Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2012 17:15:57 +0000
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Subject: [sidr] FW: question on SKI and router public key retrieval in signature attribute in BGPSEC
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Sorry, did not reply to the list.

--Sandy

________________________________________
From: Murphy, Sandra
Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2012 10:40 AM
To: nalini iyer
Subject: RE: [sidr] question on SKI and router public key retrieval in signature attribute in BGPSEC

Speaking as regular ol' member.

If I understand your questions correctly:

(a) This is just a hash, not a signature or MAC - no key required
(b) There is no de-hashing of the SKI - it is just a way to index into your pile of certs to find the right one.
(c) Again, no de-hashing of the key - the SKI is a way to identify the right certificate.

See page 18 of the protocol spec:

   o  (Step I): Locate the public key needed to verify the signature (in
      the current Signature-Segment).  To do this, consult the valid
      RPKI end-entity certificate data and look for an SKI that matches
      the value in the Subject Key Identifier 1 field of the Signature-
      Segment.

And section 4.8.2 page 9 of rfc6487 (the old res-certs draft)

   The Key Identifier used for resource certificates is the 160-bit
   SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the
   Subject Public Key, as described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280].

No key involved.  Just a cryptographic hash.  No crypto operations, just an indexing/matching into a store of data.

--Sandy, speaking as regular ol' member


________________________________________
From: sidr-bounces@ietf.org [sidr-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of nalini iyer [nlniyer2@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2012 10:20 AM
To: sidr@ietf.org
Subject: [sidr] question on SKI and router public key retrieval in signature attribute in BGPSEC

Sorry for asking this but despite looking at likely sources  off the
documents list on the SIDR page am still in the dark, and would like
to confirm suspicions.

The SKI in the signature attribute is a hash of the signing router's public key,

a) Is this hashed with the CA's pvt key?
b) How is the corresponding CA certificate (to de-hash the SKI) obtained?
c) From where is the router EE cert identified by the SKI then
obtained, or is getting the router's cert considered  unnecessary as
the router  public key is contained in the de-hashed SKI?
thank you,
N.I.
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