Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - ENDS: 2016-06-14 (June 14 2016)
Matthias Waehlisch <m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de> Thu, 16 June 2016 20:02 UTC
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Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2016 22:00:45 +0200
From: Matthias Waehlisch <m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de>
To: Sandra Murphy <sandy@tislabs.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - ENDS: 2016-06-14 (June 14 2016)
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Hi, I read v09. No objections only minor comments: line 102: BGPsec need*s* *to* be spoken only line 104: s/by small edge routers/by resource constrained edge routers/ line 119: *see* [RFC4271] line 159: s/..../etc./ lines 200-206 seem redudant to lines 208-213 line 202 s/smallish/resource constrained/ line 215: I don't know where the 84% comes from, I suppose it's just a more or less arbitrary illustration of "vast majority". I would remove the number. line 234: I would be more explicit: "How this is used in routing is up to the operator's local policy, similar to origin validation [RFC6811]." lines 243-250: This paragraph confused me. What about: Operators should be aware that controlling Invalid announcements by local preference might be delusive. Local preference affects only routes to the same set of destinations. Consider having a Valid announcement from neighbor V for prefix 10.0.0.0/16 and an Invalid announcement for 10.0.66.0/24 from neighbor I. If the local policy on a router is configured to accept Invalid announcements, then both routes will be installed, no matter of the value of local preference. (Btw, I suppose that routes to .666 will be discarded anyway ;) line 252: It sounds that only edge routers are allowed to speak BGPsec. I would weaken and say "Validation of signed paths is usually deployed at the eBGP edge." line 292: s/BGPSEC_Path/BGPsec_Path/ lines 288-295: The paragraph seems to mix transparent operation and the question of validation. What about: A route server is usually 'transparent'. To operate transparently in an environment in which the route server connects BGPsec-enabled peers, the route server needs to run BGPsec as well. This implies that the route server creates signatures per client including its own AS in the BGPsec_Path and the target ASes. However, increasing the AS hop count reduces the likelihood of best path selection. See 2.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. To overcome this problem, the route server uses pCount of zero to not increase the effective AS hop count. Furthermore, a BGPsec-aware route server needs to validate the incoming BGPsec_Path but should not drop invalids. In case the client speaks BGPsec the route server should just forward updates to clients which then validate . In case the client does not speak BGPsec, the route server reconstructs the AS_PATH and may signal the validation outcome using communities. line 300: s/Routers should default to this knob disallowing pCount 0./Routers should disallow pCount 0 by default./ line 346: I would rephrase: "Operators should deploy servers that provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to client routers." Cheers matthias On Wed, 15 Jun 2016, Sandra Murphy wrote: > It is a short document. The sentences are not complicated. It reads quickly. > > There’s been little/no wg comment on this, certainly no controversy, over the lifetime of the draft. > > But still. > > Please. Pretty please. Pretty please with sugar on top. Pretty please with a cherry on top. > > Could we get some feedback that this document is ready for publication? > > —Sandy, speaking as one of the wg co-chairs > > > On Jun 8, 2016, at 10:19 PM, Sandra Murphy <sandy@tislabs.com> wrote: > > > No responses at all. > > > > Come on folks. It’s a short document, like Chris says. > > > > You should be able to read and comment without much trouble. > > > > —Sandy, speaking as one of the wg co-chairs > > > > On Jun 1, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net> wrote: > > > >> > >> Howdy WG folks, > >> Please take this note as the start of the 2wk WGLC period for: > >> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-07> > >> > >> Abstract: > >> "Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many > >> operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and > >> present the most critical and universal. It is expected to evolve as > >> BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed." > >> > >> This is a relatively short document, 8 pages, full of wonder and > >> excitement! I hope that the wg members have read it (it's been through > >> 8+ revisions) and that they will re-read it quickly, provide comments > >> as appropriate and ideas on preparedness for publication or not. > >> > >> > >> Thanks for you time and attention to this matter, > >> > >> -Chris > >> co-chair-persona > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> sidr mailing list > >> sidr@ietf.org > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr > > > > -- Dr. Matthias Waehlisch . Freie Universitaet Berlin, Inst. fuer Informatik, AG CST . Takustr. 9, D-14195 Berlin, Germany .. mailto:m.waehlisch@fu-berlin.de .. http://www.inf.fu-berlin.de/~waehl :. Also: http://inet.haw-hamburg.de .. http://www.link-lab.net
- Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - END… Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - END… Matthias Waehlisch
- Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - END… Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - END… Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - END… Matthias Waehlisch
- Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - END… Matthias Waehlisch
- Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - END… Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - END… Sean Turner
- Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - END… Aris Lambrianidis
- Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - END… Sandra Murphy
- [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - ENDS: 2… Chris Morrow
- Re: [sidr] WGLC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops - END… Sandra Murphy