Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID
Eric Osterweil <eosterweil@verisign.com> Fri, 04 November 2011 19:05 UTC
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From: Eric Osterweil <eosterweil@verisign.com>
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Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 15:05:13 -0400
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References: <E96517DD-BAC7-4DD8-B345-562F71788C6A@tcb.net> <p06240807cad42f85eb7d@193.0.26.186> <32744.216.168.239.87.1320175657.squirrel@webmail.tcb.net> <p06240801cad6ab773279@193.0.26.186> <D9A38669-883D-4090-9F95-BC5C63220950@tcb.net> <p06240801cad800485596@193.0.26.186> <EEBF68E0-FAD9-4AF3-B81B-78760D200D9B@tcb.net> <p06240808cad85ff73d61@193.0.26.186> <080F8FFF-D2C7-4414-B53A-233F88D2009F@vpnc.org> <CAFU7BATC-6DUDNuadakwSa5wj0ryy0=49=XveBXD5Wv=5JL-ag@mail.gmail.com> <m2aa8c489s.wl%randy@psg.com>
To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Cc: sidr wg list <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID
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Hey Randy, On Nov 4, 2011, at 4:11 AM, Randy Bush wrote: >> 5) I totally agree that route leaks don't violate BGP as a protocol >> and are related to policies. But it doesn't mean route leaks are not >> security threats. Receiving spam/viruses via email is a threat >> although it doesn't violate any SMTP standards. >> >> 6) route leaking is related to a BGP threat model and isn't specific >> to BGPSEC, and BGPSEC doesn't provide any protection from that threat. >> So I'd like to second the idea of clarifying that in the document. > > could someone post a clear technical explanation of WHAT a route leak > is, HOW one would definitively detect all cases of them, and WHAT one > would do about it? This is a list of three questions. Until there is discussion of the first, it is premature to address the second two. Therefore, how about we just choose a specific case of the first: how would BGPSec protect against an instance of an event found here: http://puck.nether.net/bgp/leakinfo.cgi > you are correct, BGPsec tries to secure the BGP protocol against abuse, > not protect the internet. the latter is a very worthy goal but a bit > nebulous. of course an internet draft or two might clarify that. This seems like a very pedantic distinction. Having an AS' traffic routed through an invalid path seems like a BGP protocol abuse to me. So, in that language, it seems to me that this issue is in scope (i.e. if the path is to be protected, then subverting it is an abuse). Eric
- [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Paul Hoffman
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID George, Wes
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Shane Amante
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID George, Wes
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Jen Linkova
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Eric Osterweil
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Eric Osterweil
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Geoff Huston
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Geoff Huston
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Shane Amante
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Shane Amante
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Eric Osterweil
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Sriram, Kotikalapudi
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Russ White
- Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID Stephen Kent