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Re: [sidr] AD Review of sidr-origin-validation-signaling-09

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Wed, 30 November 2016 13:38 UTC

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Subject: Re: [sidr] AD Review of sidr-origin-validation-signaling-09
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>>> and stitching back together the tcp session... same effect.
>> 
>> Not sure why you have to stitch back together the TCP session? I
>> thought you were supposing the "attacker" was the edge node, it can
>> just apply an export policy towards the core.
> 
> say the case is inside your network, between the edge node in NYC and
> the core nodes in BWI, something on the fiber path just removes/adds
> information to the bgp stream.

< pedantry >

the point is the tcp 'stream' does not have to be hacked in any way.
the hack is at a layer above.

randy

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