[sidr] Opsdir last call review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-08
Will LIU <firstname.lastname@example.org> Wed, 30 August 2017 12:44 UTC
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From: Will LIU <email@example.com>
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Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 05:44:06 -0700
Subject: [sidr] Opsdir last call review of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-08
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Reviewer: Will LIU Review result: Ready I have reviewed draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-08 as part of the Operational directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written with the intent of improving the operational aspects of the IETF drafts. Comments that are not addressed in last call may be included in AD reviews during the IESG review. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. "This document specifies an alternative to the certificate validation procedure specified in RFC 6487 that reduces aspects of operational fragility in the management of certificates in the RPKI, while retaining essential security features. The use of this updated procedure is signalled by form of a set of alternative Object Identifiers (OIDs) indicating that the alternative version of RFC 3779 X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers, and certificate policy for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 6484) defined in this document should be used. Furthermore this document provides an alternative to ROA↓ (RFC 6482), and BGPSec↓ Router Certificate (BGPSec↓ PKI Profiles - publication requested) validation." My overall view of the document is 'Ready' for publication. One small comment is that we usually add a section for terminology for such a document with so many terms. This can also solve the issue that some of the acronyms were not given the full name.