Return-Path: X-Original-To: sidr@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: sidr@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B514212D1B7 for ; Wed, 6 Jul 2016 10:42:12 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -5.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FSL_HELO_HOME=1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id TfpRzPWIORBV for ; Wed, 6 Jul 2016 10:42:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dfw-mailout2.raytheon.com (dfw-mailout2.raytheon.com [199.46.199.208]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F10FD12D0F9 for ; Wed, 6 Jul 2016 10:42:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from tx-mailout1.directory.ray.com (tx-mailout1.directory.ray.com [147.25.138.100]) by dfw-mailout2.raytheon.com (Sentrion-MTA-4.3.1/Sentrion-MTA-4.3.1) with ESMTP id u66Hg8cj022604 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Wed, 6 Jul 2016 17:42:09 GMT Received: from smtp.bbn.com ([128.33.1.81]) by tx-mailout1.directory.ray.com (Sentrion-MTA-4.3.1/Sentrion-MTA-4.3.1) with ESMTP id u66Hg7bY011802 (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA(256 bits) verified NO) Received: from ssh.bbn.com ([192.1.122.15]:40074 helo=COMSEC.fios-router.home) by smtp.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.77 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from ) id 1bKqpq-000L5Y-LQ; Wed, 06 Jul 2016 13:42:06 -0400 To: Randy Bush , Sandra Murphy References: <8E32FD39-FD20-455C-8BEC-5752DE9C8531@tislabs.com> <8196148a-b98d-c680-c714-55498131e7ce@bbn.com> From: Stephen Kent Message-ID: <93749241-0ef4-8328-7393-cffe3a7846c4@bbn.com> Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2016 13:42:11 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.11; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.1.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------CFB01E6D31A752E95A814316" X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2016-07-06_08:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=2 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1604210000 definitions=main-1607060152 Archived-At: Cc: sidr wg list Subject: Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actions-00 X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17 Precedence: list List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2016 17:42:13 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------CFB01E6D31A752E95A814316 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Here is the revised text for the relevant part of the intro. I don't see a need to change the text in the specific attack descriptions, given this revised intro text. Additionally, when a ROA or router certificate is created that "competes" with an existing ROA or router certificate (respectively), the creation of the new ROA or router certificatemay be adverse. (A newer ROA competes with an older ROA if the newer ROA points to a different ASN, contains the same or a more specific prefix, and is issued by a different CA.A newer router certificate competes with an older router certificate if the newer one contains the same ASN a different public key, and is issued by a different CA.) Note that transferring resources, or changing of upstream providers may yield competing ROAs and/or router certificates, under some circumstances. Thus not all instances of competition are adverse actions. Steve --------------CFB01E6D31A752E95A814316 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Here is the revised text for the relevant part of the intro.

I don't see a need to change the text in the specific attack descriptions, given this revised intro text.


   Additionally, when a ROA or router certificate is created that

   "competes" with an existing ROA or router certificate (respectively),

   the creation of the new ROA or router certificate may be adverse.

   (A newer ROA competes with an older ROA if the newer ROA points to a

   different ASN, contains the same or a more specific prefix, and is

   issued by a different CA.  A newer router certificate competes with

   an older router certificate if the newer one contains the same ASN

   a different public key, and is issued by a different CA.)  Note that

   transferring resources, or changing of upstream providers may yield

   competing ROAs and/or router certificates, under some circumstances.

   Thus not all instances of competition are adverse actions.


Steve
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